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Two experiments a sessed effects of activation of prior knowledge through small-group discussion. 
Subjects were given a description ofnatural phenomena and were asked to elaborate on possible 
explanations for them. In Experiment 1,small groups of subjects were presented with a problem 
describing the behavior of a blood cell in pure water and in a salt solution. No additional text 
was studied. The experimental subjects produced more than twice as many propositions about 
osmosis (i.e. the biological process explaining the blood cell's behavior) as a control group 
produced. Experiment 2 investigated ffects of problem analysis on subsequent text processing 
for subjects with imprecise prior knowledge (novices) and subjects with precise knowledge 
(experts). Recall of the text showed considerable facilitative effects of problem analysis. Results 
are explained in terms of faster accessibility of prior knowledge and better integration of new 
information i to explanatory models that may exist before, or are actively constructed during, 
problem analysis. 
Attempts to understand the physical world involve the use 
of cognitive structures that represent mechanisms or princi- 
ples underlying the phenomena observed. These cognitions 
may vary from highly sophisticated to quite naive. They may 
emerge as the result of formal education but often are con- 
structed "spontaneously" while a person is experiencing the 
phenomena concerned. 
Take thunder and lightning. By scientists, this natural phe- 
nomenon is interpreted in terms of large differences in elec- 
trical potential between clouds charged with static electricity 
and the earth. Young children however, generally favor ex- 
planations involving the clash of clouds, and in earlier cen- 
turies thunder was attributed to the rage of the gods. These 
naive "mental models" are, like the models of science, not 
merely descriptive of what is going on in the outer world. 
They are truly "explanatory," because they clarify why the 
world is as it is. In addition, these conceptions can be consid- 
ered models because they usually consist of a set of concepts 
connected by causal inks that help to interpret the phenom- 
ena concerned in terms of the underlying structure of these 
phenomena (Clement, 1979; Gentner & Stevens, 1983). 
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Research in the domain of science teaching has established 
the crucial role played by these existing cognitive structures 
in the comprehension of expository texts (Caramazza, Mc- 
Closkey, & Green, 1981; Champagne, Gunstone, & Klopfer, 
1983; Clement, 1982). In particular, when students' naive 
conceptions of natural phenomena deviate from scientific 
explanations, tudents have been reported to show serious 
difficulty in understanding the latter (Brumby, 1984; Green, 
McCloskey, & Caramazza, 1980). One reason may be that in 
those cases, students are unable to relate what they already 
know about a subject o the new, discrepant information. In 
an early study on misconceptions in the domain of physics, 
for instance, Driver and Easley (1969) noted that high school 
students conversant with Newtonian mechanics nevertheless 
explained the movement of balls along a track by hypothe- 
sizing an "inner force" that pushed the balls forward. Accord- 
ing to Newton, no force is exerted on a moving object (leaving 
friction aside). These students eem to have failed in integrat- 
ing the new knowledge into existing structures in a way that 
would affect the old knowledge. 
Instruct ional  Methods  A imed at Integrat ion 
Several instructional approaches have attempted to deal 
with the problem of the integration of new knowledge into 
old. The literature suggests at least three distinct approaches. 
The first is to encourage the person to produce laborations 
on the basis of prior knowledge while processing new infor- 
mation. Examples of this approach are: asking students to 
answer questions about a text, to take notes, to write a 
summary, or to paraphrase the text (Bretzing & Kulhavy, 
1981; Glover, Plake, Roberts, Zimmer, & Palmere, 1981; 
Hansen & Pearson, 1983). 
The second approach is to provide students with a descrip- 
tion of a concrete model that can be considered an analogy 
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of the concepts to be understood and that is formulated in 
terms of concepts familiar to the learner. Examples are de- 
scriptions of mechanical models, concrete advance organizers, 
and metaphors (Mayer & Bromage, 1980; Royer & Cable, 
1976; Simons, 1984; Vosniadou & Schommer, 1988). These 
analogies are considered to help in bridging the gap between 
what is already known and what should be learned, by acting 
as a frame into which the new concepts could be integrated. 
More recently, a third approach has been suggested, 
namely, to encourage learners to construct an explanatory 
model by themselves on the basis of their prior knowledge. 
Typically, students are confronted with the description of a 
set of natural phenomena or witness an experiment. They are 
then asked to generate an explanation for the phenomena, or 
predict the outcome of the experiment (Inagaki & Hatano, 
1977; Smith, Johnson & Johnson, 1981). Subsequently, they 
read an expository text on the subject, attend lectures about 
it, or see the actual result of the experiment. Champagne, 
Klopfer, and Gunstone (1982), for instance, describe an ap- 
proach in which students are presented with qualitative me- 
chanics problems, such as the following: "When a gun is fired, 
the bullet leaves the gun with some speed. How does the 
bullet's peed at the muzzle of the gun compare with the gun's 
speed at that time? How does the direction of the bullet's 
motion compare with the direction of the gun's motion?" 
Each student is required to produce a solution and then share 
his or her representation f the problem with the class. Sub- 
sequently, the teacher presents the physicist's analysis of the 
problem. It is suggested that thinking about a possible solution 
of the problem activates relevant prior knowledge that, in 
turn, facilitates the comprehension of the new information. 
The knowledge activated by this procedure would be repre- 
sented as a causal model explaining the problem. To date, 
however, no empirical data are available to substantiate his 
claim. 
In this article, a variation on the paradigm described by 
Champagne t al. (1982) is proposed--that is, using small- 
group discussion as the vehicle for the construction of an 
initial representation f the problem. Small groups of learners 
are given a description of a set of natural phenomena (e.g.: 
"A red blood cell is put into pure water under a microscope. 
The blood cell swells rapidly and eventually bursts. Another 
red blood cell is added to a solution of salt in water and is 
observed to shrink.") The learners are asked to explain these 
phenomena in terms of underlying processes, principles, or 
mechanisms. In other words, they are asked to construct an 
explanatory model using prior knowledge activated by the 
situation described by the problem (Barrows & Tamblyn, 
1980; Schmidt, 1982; Schmidt & De Volder, 1984). It is only 
after the students discuss this problem and propose possible 
explanations that a text is presented that provides information 
relevant o the solution of the problem (in the case of the 
present example, a text on the osmotic process). The idea is 
that activation of relevant knowledge prior to the student's 
processing of a text would facilitate the integration of new 
concepts embedded in that text into existing cognitive struc- 
tures. 
In summary, it is assumed here that discussing a problem 
mobilizes relevant prior knowledge and thereby enables learn- 
ers to deal with the problem at some level of initial under- 
standing. Second, the knowledge activated by the analysis of 
the problem will be "packaged" in a problem-specific explan- 
atory model that takes into account the constraints of the 
task. (The task is to explain the phenomena in terms of an 
underlying process). Third, this model, constructed for un- 
derstanding the problem, will facilitate the comprehension of
new information relevant to the natural phenomena de- 
scribed. 
This analysis leads to a number of questions of interest: (a) 
To what extent is prior, explanatory knowledge activated by 
small-group discussion of a problem? (b) Do students con- 
struct situation-specific explanatory models while they are 
representing a problem? (c) To what extent does discussing a 
problem before processing a relevant ext support he acqui- 
sition of causal, explanatory concepts? (d) Does the possession 
of precise, as opposed to imprecise, prior knowledge differ- 
entially facilitate the construction of an initial representation 
and subsequent text processing? That is, will students with 
adequate prior knowledge for understanding a problem ben- 
efit more from the proposed procedure than those with in- 
adequate knowledge or no specific knowledge? 
This article reports on two experiments designed to inves- 
tigate these issues. Experiment 1was carried out to assess the 
extent o which analysis of a problem through small-group 
discussion activates previously acquired knowledge. To that 
end, small groups of subjects were presented with the blood 
cell problem. These subjects had studied the subject of osmosis 
pertaining to the explanation of the blood cell problem as 
part of their high school curriculum more than 2 years before 
Experiment 1 was carried out. In Experiment 1, they were 
required to recall everything they remembered about osmosis, 
and their performances were compared with those of subjects 
who analyzed a control problem prior to recall. Because the 
objective of Experiment 1 was to study the activation effect 
of problem analysis, no text was studied.l 
In Experiment 2, effects of problem analysis on subsequent 
text processing were investigated. Subjects either analyzed the 
blood cell problem or a control problem prior to studying a
text on osmosis. In order to investigate possible differential 
effects of amount of prior knowledge on subsequent recall, 
both subjects with imprecise prior knowledge (novices) and 
subjects with precise knowledge (experts) were involved in 
Experiment 2. In addition, verbatim transcriptions of the 
discussions were used to study the nature of the initial problem 
representations for both groups. It was assumed that these 
In this sense, Experiment 1 suggests a methodological elaboration 
of the "classical" instructional-aids approach, because, unlike in other 
research in this area, effects of the experimental treatment itself are 
the subject of investigation. Usually, effects of a certain manipulation 
(e.g., advance organizers or prequestions) are only investigated in 
conjunction with a text. In those cases, the effectiveness of the 
experimental reatment is assessed by comparing "treatment + text" 
with "control problem + text." In Experiment 1, however, effects of 
a "treatment-without-text" are studied. This approach enables the 
investigator to observe directly the kind of cognitive changes produced 
by the instructional id and is designed to facilitate the understanding 
of a subsequent text. 
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transcriptions would provide information on the extent to 
which subjects construct explanatory models specific to the  
problem at hand. 
The major dependent variable in the analyses to follow is 
the number of  propositions in free recall. A distinction is 
made between umbers of  explanatory and descriptive prop- 
ositions recalled. According to Mayer (1985), the number of  
explanatory propositions in free recall is a sensitive measure 
of  depth of  integration of  subject matter into existing knowl- 
edge structures. Bromage and Mayer (1981), for instance, 
report a correlation of .59 between the number of  explanatory 
propositions in the recall of a text and performance on a 
problem-solving test on which subjects had to apply knowl- 
edge acquired from that text. They suggest hat the better 
problem solvers had constructed a representation of  the in- 
formation that was better integrated with their previous 
knowledge of the subject. The distinction between explanation 
and description appears to be relevant here, given that our 
subjects were requested to produce explanations for the phe- 
nomena described. 
Exper iment  1 
The purpose of  Experiment 1 was to assess the extent to 
which prior knowledge is activated through small-group dis- 
cussion of  a problem. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 39 college students (31 women and 8 
men). Average age was 19.4 years, with a standard eviation of 1.1. 
The subjects' academic background included biology, although it was 
not part of their present training. The subject matter to be activated, 
osmosis, had been part of a course given almost 2 years before 
Ex0eriment 1 was carried out. The subjects were paid for their 
participation. 
Materials. Materials consisted of a description of the red blood 
cell problem, a control problem, and a free recall test. The red blood 
cell problem was formulated as already described. The control prob- 
lem was phrased as follows: "At Amsterdam airport, one can observe 
how airplanes, weighing several tons, take off apparently without 
trouble. How can this phenomenon be explained?" 
The free recall test consisted of three blank pages and a front page 
containing the following instruction: "Write down everything you 
remember about the subject of osmosis. Write in full sentences and 
avoid abbreviations ordrawings." 
Procedure. The subjects were randomly assigned to either an 
experimental (n = 20) or a control condition (n = 19). Both the 
experimental nd the control group were then subdivided into three 
small groups of about equal size. An experimenter was assigned to 
each of these groups. All subjects received written instructions, ex- 
plaining in some detail what was expected of them. Appendix A 
contains the text of the instructions. (The example provided in the 
instructions--static electricity as an explanation for the thunderstorm 
phenomenon--is, of course, unrelated to the subject of osmosis.) The 
experimenter actively questioned subjects to check their understand- 
ing of the way they were to proceed with the experimental problem. 
The introduction took 5 to l0 min. Subsequently, the subjects were 
given 15 min to formulate xplanations for either the blood cell 
problem or the airplane problem. After reading the problem for about 
l min, the subjects began to propose xplanations. The experimenter 
acted as a chairperson, summarizing the different points of view at 
regular intervals. Recording the discussion verified that no informa- 
tion was provided from which the subjects could derive insights into 
the underlying mechanisms ofeither problem. Seventy-three p rcent 
of the contributions of the experimenters consisted of questions for 
clarification; the remaining remarks were summaries that used the 
same terminology as the subjects or encouraging sounds, such as "Uh 
hub." The experimenter was instructed to terminate the discussion if
no further esponse was given to his question of whether somebody 
wished to add clarifications or explanations. The different groups 
used 8 min, 55 s on the average (range-= 8 min, 35 s-9 min, 40 s). 
On the average, subjects talked for about 87% of the time; there were 
only marginal differences between groups. 
Subsequently, the free recall test on osmosis was administered to
both the experimental nd the control group. 
Scoring. In the scoring process, the free recall protocols produced 
by the subjects were first parsed by two independent judges into 
subject-predicate units (or propositions), each expressing a single 
idea. The interrater agreement for this task was 92%. The boundaries 
of two adjacent propositions can be found by identifying appropriate 
linguistic markers in the text: conjunctions, adverbs, relative pro- 
nouns, semicolons, and full stops. An example is provided by the 
following protocol (slashes mark boundaries): 
Osmosis is the process/by which a greater concentration attracts 
water from a lesser concentration,/when these concentrations 
are separated by a semipermeable membrane./The Greek word 
osmos means push./The aspiration of water molecules i realized 
by diffusion/(diffundere m ans to disperse)./ 
Similar results, using somewhat different criteria, are produced by 
applying procedures proposed by Winograd (1983) and Mayer (1985). 
Next, each proposition was checked for accuracy. In addition, the 
propositions were categorized as either explanatory or descriptive. An 
explanatory proposition was defined as a statement that either char- 
acterizes a process or describes the conditions under which this 
process occurs. All other propositions were considered escriptive. 
The next sentence provides three examples of explanatory proposi- 
tions: "If salt solutions at different sides of a semipermeable mem- 
brane have a different concentration,/water molecules will move 
through the membrane from the higher to the lower concentration,/ 
until equilibrium isrestored." An example of a descriptive proposition 
is, "Osmosis occurs both in people and plants." Interrater agreement 
for this task was 79%. Differences of opinion between judges were 
solved by discussion. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 displays the average number of  correct propositions 
in the protocols of the subjects in Experiment 1. 
Table 1 
d verage Number of  Explanatory and Descriptive 
Propositions Produced in Experiment I 
Explana- Descrip- 
tions tions Total 
Group M SD M SD M SD 
Problem-analysis 
group (n = 20) 14.4 6.2 12.8 5.8 27.2 9.1 
Control group 
(n = 19) 4.4 1.9 7.5 3.0 11.8 5.4 
Total (n = 39) 9.7 6.6 10.2 5.4 19.7 7.5 
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A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out 
that used condition as a between-subjects variable and type 
of propositions produced as a within-subjects variable. Sub- 
jects who analyzed the blood cell problem produced signifi- 
cantly more propositions related to osmosis than did subjects 
in the control condition, F(1, 37) = 31.06, MSe = 36.49, p < 
.00 I. This result suggests hat problem analysis through small- 
group discussion is a strong activating medium of knowledge 
acquired at an earlier stage. (As has been indicated, subjects 
of both groups were taught about osmosis almost 2 years 
before the experiment was carried out). The problem-analysis 
group produced more than twice as many propositions as did 
the control group. It should be noted that it was not the 
presence or absence of an activating procedure per se that 
caused the effect, because prior knowledge of the control 
group had been activated as well by the instruction to write 
down everything remembered about osmosis. Therefore, the 
small-group discussion that was intended to explain the phe- 
nomena described in the blood cell problem must be held 
responsible for the differences observed. 
No significant difference was found between the number of 
descriptive and the number of explanatory propositions pro- 
duced, F(1, 37) = 1.65, MSe = 5.84, p < .21. However, a 
significant interaction effect emerged between experimental 
manipulation and type of propositions produced, F(1, 37) = 
19.27, MSe = 5.84, p < .001. In addition, the experimental 
treatment affected both the number of descriptive proposi- 
tions produced, F(1, 37) = 12.32, MS~ = 21.58, p < .01, and 
the number of explanations, F(1, 37) = 47.24, MSe = 20.75, 
p < .001. 
These data appear to indicate that problem analysis through 
small-group discussion ot only stimulates the activation of 
prior knowledge but is particularly effective in encouraging 
subjects to come up with explanatory statements. Given the 
task at hand (that is, to explain a natural phenomenon in 
terms of an underlying process), the subjects eemed to recon- 
struct their prior knowledge of osmosis into explanatory, 
causal networks of propositions. Causal networks are known 
to provide greater cognitive coherence, which in turn may 
account for the superior ecall (Gentner & Stevens, 1983). 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest hat prior knowledge 
can be mobilized by problem analysis. Experiment 2 considers 
the question of whether problem analysis prior to the proc- 
essing of a relevant text facilitates the comprehension of 
information from that text. Prior knowledge activation may 
be a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition for 
new learning. According to Van Dijk and Kintsch (1984), 
existing cognitive structures hould interact with new infor- 
mation to allow for the development of new, or the modifi- 
cation of existing, structures. Subjects must relate the contents 
of the problem analysis to the contents of the text. If they fail 
to do so, differences between conditions in the recall of a 
problem-relevant text are not expected to be found. 
As has been made clear in the introduction to this article, 
subjects who only have general world knowledge available for 
explaining natural phenomena, nd whose world knowledge 
conflicts with scientific concepts, may be particularly likely 
to fail to relate what they already know to what they are 
learning. If these subjects' knowledge is simply insufficient to 
make any sense of a problem, facilitative ffects of problem 
analysis are not to be expected. By contrast, subjects with 
sufficient knowledge to understand the problem would be 
expected to benefit more from the instructional procedure, 
because they have more knowledge available into which the 
new information can be integrated. Cook and Mayer (in 
Mayer, 1985) report data that appear to support his point of 
view. For the present experiment, he implication would be 
that problem analysis prior to text processing would be less 
effective for subjects without specific prior knowledge than 
for subjects with prior knowledge. 
This analysis, however, contradicts the idea, expressed by 
some investigators, that making students aware of the limita- 
tions of their present knowledge for understanding ew infor- 
mation is crucial to the occurrence of learning (Champagne, 
et al. 1982; Inagaki & Hatano, 1977). As Anderson (1977) 
puts it, "My conjecture isthat the likelihood of schema change 
is maximized when a person recognizes a difficulty in his 
current position and comes to see that the difficulty can be 
handled within a different schema" (p. 427). Because the 
knowledge of novices by definition is poor in comparison to 
that of more advanced students, the novices may more clearly 
experience discrepancies between their present state of under- 
standing and the knowledge necessary to comprehend the 
problem in depth. Therefore, the analysis of a relevant prob- 
lem prior to the processing of a text may have its greatest 
impact on them. 
In order to test these conflicting hypotheses, both subjects 
with aspecific, general world knowledge (novices) and subjects 
with specific prior knowledge (experts) were exposed to the 
instructional method. The analysis uggested by the introduc- 
tion to this article would predict that experts would benefit 
more from the analysis of a relevant problem prior to reading, 
because of the availability of relevant prior knowledge, 
whereas the analysis of Anderson and others would predict 
the reverse. 
Until now, we have assumed that subjects, when faced with 
a problem, construct an explanatory model that fits the spe- 
cific situation described and is based on prior knowledge. 
However, no direct evidence has been provided to substantiate 
this claim. Therefore, the second objective of Experiment 2
was to provide qualitative information in this respect. Ver- 
batim transcriptions of the discussions were analyzed to pro- 
vide insight into the nature of the explanations subjects give 
while analyzing the blood cell 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 88 students from a Dutch secondary 
school: 46 ninth-grade students (18 boys and 28 girls) and 42 tenth- 
grade students (24 boys and 18 girls). Average age of the ninth-grade 
subjects was 14.91 years (SD = 0.59), the tenth-grade subjects were 
on the average 16.14 years old (SD = 0.52). 
The ninth-grade students were unfamiliar with the biological sub- 
ject that had to be studied as part of the experiment, although they 
had general biology knowledge, including global knowledge of the 
structure of cells. Consequently, they were considered novices. The 
614 SCHMIDT ET AL. 
tenth-grade subjects had finished the part of their biology course that 
included the subject under study; they were the "experts" in this 
experiment. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to the conditions of the experi- 
ment; thus, four groups were created---experimental and control 
groups for both novices and experts. 
Materials. Materials consisted of the two problem descriptions 
used in Experiment 1, a text and a free recall test. 
The text consisted of a six-page, typewritten booklet containing 
about 2,200 words. It was entitled "Osmosis and Diffusion" and 
contained passages on diffusion, diffusion rate, permeability of cell 
membranes, osmosis, osmotic pressure, osmotic value, plant cell 
structure, turgor, and plasmolysis. No reference to osmosis in blood 
ceils was made. 
The free recall test consisted of three blank pages and a front page 
giving the following instruction: "Write down everything you remem- 
ber about he text on osmosis and diffusion. Write in full sentences 
and avoid a telegram style or drawings." 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the one followed in 
Experiment 1. All subjects were, within their condition, randomly 
assigned to groups of 6 or 7. The experimental subjects analyzed the 
blood cell problem, whereas the control groups analyzed the airplane 
problem. Average time used for discussion was 9 min, 10 s (range = 
_ 1 rain, 25 s). No systematic differences between ovices and experts 
or between treatments were found. On average, subjects talked for 
about 82% of the time, with only marginal differences between 
groups. 
The text was studied for no longer than 20 rain. In addition, the 
subjects had to complete a short questionnaire unrelated to the 
experiment, toprevent carry-over effects. 
Finally, the free recall test was administered without ime limits. 
Analysis. Scoring of the free recall protocols was carried out in 
ways similar to those in Experiment 1. Intcrrater agreement for 
parsing was 96%. Interrater agreements for correctness/incorrectness 
of propositions was 88%. Judgments on whether propositions were 
either explanatory ordescriptive coincided in 89% of the cases. Data 
were analyzed by applying a three-way ANOVA with two between- 
subjects variables (treatment and level of expertise) and one within- 
subject variable (type of propositions recalled: explanatory vs. descrip- 
tive.) 
The audiotapes of the discussions of the blood cell problem were 
transcribed and the protocols were screened for explanations. 
Results and Discussion 
Free recall. Table 2 summarizes the results of free recall 
for both the experimental nd the control condition, and for 
the novices and experts. 
The three-way ANOVA yielded the following results: A sig- 
nificant difference was found for the total number  of propo- 
sitions correctly recalled, F(1, 82) = 6.15, MSe = 116.69,19 <
.05. As could be expected, experts produced significantly more 
accurate propositions than did novices, F(1, 82) = 82.47, MSe 
= 116.69,/9 < .001. The interaction effect between treatment 
and level of expertise was not significant, F( l, 82) = .01,/9 < 
.93. These results indicate that presenting subjects with the 
blood cell problem and instructing them to produce expla- 
nations for its behavior generally facilitates the processing and 
retrieval of a problem-relevant text. Although the difference 
between the experimental nd the control group appears to 
be greater for the novices than for the experts, the absence of 
Table 2 
Average Number of  Correct Propositions Recalled in 
Experiment 2 
Blood cell Control problem problem 
Type of proposition M SD n M SD n 
Novices' propositions 26.0 12.4 22 18.5 6.6 24 
Explanations 19.5 9.9 - -  13.7 6.5 - -  
Descriptions 6.5 4.1 - -  4.8 1.8 - -  
Experts' propositions 53.4 25.7 21 48.2 15.6 21 
Explanations 41.8 18.3 - -  32.5 11.5 - -  
Descriptions 11.6 7.3 - -  15.2 7.6 - -  
an interaction effect between level of expertise and treatment 
does not directly support the idea expressed by Anderson 
(1977) and others that more learning takes place in subjects 
who experience a larger discrepancy between what they know 
and what there is to know about a topic. However, neither is 
the straightforward hypothesis that those who have more prior 
knowledge would benefit more from the activation procedure 
supported by the results of Experiment 2. Experts and novices 
alike seem to be influenced by the problem analysis prior to 
text processing. 
Overall, significantly more explanatory propositions than 
descriptive propositions were recalled from the text, F(1, 82) 
= 179.16, MSe = 65.41,/9 < .001. More interesting than this 
main effect are the significant interactions between treatment 
and type of propositions recalled, F( I ,  82) = 7.77, MSe = 
65.4 l,/9 < .01, and level of expertise and type of propositions 
recalled, F(1, 82) = 20.47, MSo = 65.41,/9 < -001. 2 
As can be observed in Figure 1, the difference between 
treatment effects is much larger for explanations than for 
descriptions. For explanations, the difference between treat- 
ments was significant, F(1, 82) = 4.73, MSe = 254.93,/9 < 
.05; for descriptions, however, the difference was not signifi- 
cant, F(1, 82) = .18, MS~ = 54.40,/9 < .67. These outcomes 
imply that the experimental effect as reflected in the recall 
was entirely due to the processing and retrieval of explanative 
information. Descriptive facts are not better remembered as 
a consequence of the analysis of the blood cell problem. This 
effect is stronger for the experts than it is for the novices, 
hence the interaction effect between level of expertise and 
type of propositions recalled. 
These data unambiguously demonstrate that asking sub- 
jects to explain a set of natural phenomena in terms of their 
causal underlying processes induces subjects to pick up ex- 
planatory information from a text that pertains to these 
phenomena. The retention of descriptive facts, however, is 
not specifically supported by the instructional procedure. 
These results are in accordance with other studies that have 
used the explanation/description distinction in recall, notably 
Mayer and Cook's (1981) study on prose comprehension a d 
problem solving and Peper and Mayer's (1978) note-taking 
research. 
2 The three-way interaction between treatment, level of expertise, 
and type of propositions recalled was not significant, F(I, 82) = 1.32, 
MS~ = 65.41, p < .25. 
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Figure 1. 
40 
Number of pn 
30 
20 
10' 
ositions 
• O- Blood call problem 
Control problem 
! i 
Descriptions Explanations 
Type of propositions 
Average number of correct propositions recalled by experimental nd control groups. 
The question of course, is, Why is explanatory information 
better remembered under the conditions described in the 
present experiments? At least three answers are possible. The 
first is a motivational explanation. Subjects were confronted 
by a problem situation for which they had no satisfactory 
solutions. Berlyne (1978) suggested that whenever an individ- 
ual perceives a discrepancy between what he or she knows 
about a subject and what there is to know, a cognitive- 
motivational process is triggered. This process, which Berlyne 
calls epistemic curiosity, is expressed in information-seeking 
behavior aimed at bridging the knowledge gap. However, an 
implication of this hypothesis would be that the expert group, 
which generally had no difficulty explaining why the blood 
cell swelled or shrunk, would experience l ss epistemic uri- 
osity, and hence would show less gains than the novice group. 
This prediction, however, contradicts the outcomes of the 
present experiment, because no interaction effect was found 
between treatment and levels of expertise. In addition, this 
motivational hypothesis does not clarify why explanatory 
information in particular would be better emembered. 
A second possibility is a selective attention explanation. 
Because subjects were asked to produce explanations for the 
behavior of the blood cell, they might have attended specifi- 
cally to explanatory information in the text on osmosis and 
diffusion and might therefore have shown superior ecall for 
that type of information. However, studies within the atten- 
tional framework have generally demonstrated that paying 
attention to specific parts of a text indeed results in superior 
recall of those parts, but at the expense of recall of parts that 
receive less attention (Goetz, Schallert, Reynolds, & Radin, 
1983; Rothkopf & Billington, 1979). Thus, although this 
hypothesis may explain why the experimental groups showed 
superior ecall of explanatory information, it fails to explain 
why the experimental group's recall of descriptive information 
was not poorer than the recall of the control groups as a result 
of the former's giving less attention to those elements of the 
text. 
The third candidate for an answer is the activation hypoth- 
esis discussed in the introduction. According to this hypoth- 
esis, while trying to explain the phenomena described in the 
problem, subjects activate prior knowledge about the present 
or related subjects. Because of the constraints of the task, the 
knowledge activated will tend to be explanatory in nature. 
When the text is processed, the existing cognitive structures 
in which the information derived from the text has to be 
integrated will tend to be the previously activated explanatory 
knowledge, simply because this knowledge will be more easily 
accessed than will nonactivated descriptive knowledge. This 
would explain not only why more information is recalled 
from the text but also why explanatory information in partic- 
ular is better remembered. In addition, explanatory knowl- 
edge is generally more coherent han are descriptive facts, 
because various propositions tend to be causally linked in 
memory, which may facilitate retrieval of those propositions 
in particular. 
Verbatim transcriptions ofthe problem discussions. The 
purpose of Experiment 2 was dual: (1) to investigate the extent 
to which activation of prior knowledge through small-group 
discussion influences the comprehension f explanatory new 
information and (2) to provide qualitative information con- 
cerning the nature of the explanatory concepts used in the 
representation f the blood cell problem prior to the process- 
ing of.the text. The question of interest with regard to the 
second issue was, In response to a problem, do subjects 
construct situation-specific explanatory models based on prior 
knowledge? An explanatory model was defined here as a set 
of concepts, connected by causal links, that provides an 
interpretation of observable phenomena in terms of their 
underlying structure (Clement, 1979; Gentner & Stevens, 
1983). 
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In order to find an answer to the question at hand, the 
analyses of the blood cell problem conducted by the various 
experimental groups were transcribed. In the following dis- 
cussion, transcriptions of the novices' discussions are empha- 
sized, because the expert's groups came up with scientifically 
adequate xplanations. 3 
A representative, verbatim excerpt illustrates the way in 
which explanatory models appear in the transcriptions. Those 
comments in italics represent an explanatory model, pre- 
sented by Subject 2 ($2), that specified S2's view as to why 
the blood cell shrinks. 
Experimenter (E): "Who wishes to say something about it? 
(silence for several seconds) It is difficult, isn't it?" 
Subject 1 (S1): "The only thing I know is that there are two 
blood corpuscles, a red and a white one." 
E: "Yes...  " 
S 1: "That was the only thing." 
E: "And here the story is apparently about a red blood cell, one 
of the two. Could someone xplain what happens to it?" 
$2: "ln salt it may dry up." 
E: "Yes..." 
$2: "That's why it shrinks" 
$3: "Yes, you mean . . . . . . . . . .  " 
$2: "Salt withdraws.. ,  eh . . . withdraws liquids, because if you 
have a wine stain in the tablecloth, you immediately throw salt 
onto it, and then the salt absorbs it. So ! think that in case of  the 
blood corpuscle in the salt, the salt withdraws blood from the 
blood cell. That is why it shrinks." 
The explanatory model displayed in this excerpt by $2 is 
based on a postulated hygroscopic property of salt, which 
causes blood to be withdrawn from the cell. According to $2, 
salt attracts liquids, and this property accounted, in his view, 
for the shrinking of the cell. This appears as Explanation 8 in 
Appendix B. Appendix B summarizes all the explanatory 
models found in the novices' discussions. None of the expla- 
nations occurred more than twice in different groups. 
The information provided by Appendix B suggests that, 
while they discussed the problem, subjects indeed constructed 
explanatory models that fit the situation described in the 
problem and that were based on whatever prior knowledge 
and experience they could bring to that situation. Known 
objects, such as "sponges" or "valves"; processes, such as 
"corrosion" or "digestion"; and well-known attributes, such 
as the oxygen-carrying role of red blood cells, were combined 
into explanations unique to the particular problem situation. 
These familiar elements constituted the building blocks for 
the construction of mental models dealing with the new and 
unfamiliar situation. Activation of prior knowledge through 
small-group discussion ot only mobilizes existing knowledge 
but appears to restructure this knowledge by creating new 
relations between concepts in a way that make sense to the 
persons who produce these relations. 
A number of additional observations have been made by 
studying the transcriptions. First, novices dealt with the blood 
cell problem mainly by segmentation; that is, they showed a 
tendency to come up with separate xplanations for each of 
the phenomena described. Only one group eventually pro- 
duced an explanation that related the different phenomena 
(Explanation 12). Apparently, the problem had a level of 
complexity that could not be dealt with easily by the novices. 
This contrasts with the solution strategies used by the experts, 
who explained the phenomena in relation to each other by 
one or two underlying principles. The causal explanations 
provided by novices appear to have a much more narrow 
application range than those of the experts. This finding is in 
accordance with findings in the domain of physics, where 
novices were also shown to be more cue dependent than 
experts in their responses to problems (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981). 
Second, the novices predominantly seem to have searched 
for analogies that were based on surface characteristics of the 
problem (balloons inflated up to bursting or bodies floating 
in the sea) and to have applied them to the new situation. For 
instance, the swelling of the cell and the availability of water 
reminded them of the behavior of a sponge; therefore, they 
postulated little sponges within the cell (Explanation 1). In 
contrast, the experts postulated a not-directly-observable 
physical process underlying the problem and then attempted 
to explain the phenomena in the light of this process. They 
recognized the problem as a specific example of a more 
general principle and applied this principle to demonstrate 
that this was indeed the case. 
Third, there was a general awareness among the novices 
that their models had only limited explanatory power, as 
witnessed by frequent remarks uch as, "This doesn't explain 
the bursting." 
Fourth, although the novices' explanations (for instance, 
the presence of "valves" in the cell's wall) contained elements 
useful to the understanding of the problems at hand, they 
were invariably incorrect. This suggests hat it is not the extent 
to which previously held beliefs are correct hat determines 
the extent o which learning will be facilitated, but rather the 
clash between new information and deficient knowledge of 
which the learner is aware. 
Genera l  Discussion 
The issue raised in the introduction to this article concerns 
the question of to what extent he acquisition of explanatory, 
3 For reference purposes, it may be useful to explain the osmotic 
process underlying the swelling, bursting, and shrinking phenomena 
described in the problem. The central mechanism involved is that of 
partial diffusion. If two solutions of salt in water are separated by a 
semipermeable m mbrane, the water molecules tend to move freely 
through the membrane, whereas the salt molecules cannot pass 
through. If concentrations onboth sides differ, more water will flow 
from the smaller concentration to the larger concentration than vice 
versa, until both concentrations are equal. This can be understood at
the molecule level by imagining a semipermeable membrane on 
which, at every moment and on both sides, 100 molecules bounce. 
If, on Side A, 80 water and 20 salt molecules bounce, and on Side B, 
50 water and 50 salt molecules bounce, a net flow of 30 water 
molecules from A to B exists until both concentrations are equal. 
Therefore, if a blood cell with a concentration equivalent to 0.9% 
NaC1 is put into pure water, osmosis takes place, and, because an 
equilibrium between concentrations cannot be attained, the cell even- 
tually bursts. The shrinking of the blood cell is caused by osmosis of 
H20 from within the cell. 
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causal knowledge about natural phenomena can be fostered 
by instruction. 
In the experiments we conducted, subjects were asked to 
discuss a problem describing the behavior of a blood cell in 
two environments. The hypothesis was that asking subjects to 
explain these phenomena in terms of an underlying process 
would induce them to construct a mental model of what was 
happening to the blood cell and why that was happening. This 
explanatory model would be based on prior knowledge acti- 
vated by the procedure and elaborated on by means of the 
discussion. The resulting cognitive structure would then facil- 
itate the processing of a text on the subject (Schmidt, 1982). 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that problem analysis 
is an effective knowledge activation procedure. Subjects who 
analyzed the blood cell problem produced more than twice 
as many propositions when asked to write down everything 
they remembered about osmosis as did control subjects. The 
effect was particularly clear with respect to explanatory prop- 
ositions in the recall: The experimental group produced more 
than three times as many of these. This outcome was attrib- 
uted to the specific format of the activating procedure, which 
encourages subjects to reconstruct their existing knowledge 
on osmosis uch that a more coherent "situation model" (Van 
Dijk & Kintsch, 1984) is produced. This greater coherence 
may be responsible for the superior ecall. 
The outcomes of Experiment 2 indicate that analyzing a
problem facilitates the subsequent processing of a relevant 
text. Overall differences in free recall between the experimen- 
tal and control conditions were found. When the total number 
of propositions recalled was further analyzed into explanatory 
and descriptive propositions, it was demonstrated that the 
treatment had influenced only the recall of explanatory infor- 
mation from text. No differences were found for descriptions. 
This result was ascribed to a faster accessibility of explanatory 
information due to the activation task, which, in turn, would 
facilitate the assimilation of the new information. In addition, 
it was proposed that part of the effect may be caused by a 
greater coherence within causal propositional networks 
(Mayer, 1985). 
Analysis of the transcriptions of the small-group discussions 
in Experiment 2 revealed that subjects did not just reproduce 
whatever they knew about the phenomena presented, but 
actively constructed causal models that fitted the specific 
problem at hand. In the process, they used known concepts 
or attributes and combined them into new structures. The 
novices tended to break down the problem into its constituent 
parts and to propose xplanations for each of the phenomena 
separately, whereas the experts came up with one or two 
general underlying principles, of which the phenomena were 
considered to be just different manifestations. In addition, the 
novices made an extensive use of analogies that appear to 
have had certain manifestations in common with the phenom- 
ena described, or they applied well-known, but sometimes 
irrelevant, properties of the agents involved to explain the 
problem. 
A somewhat surprising finding was that the novices' con- 
ceptions of the processes underlying the blood cell problem 
were not just imprecise or superficial, but simply wrong. This 
raises the question of how incorrect prior knowledge, if acti- 
vated, can nevertheless be helpful in mastering new informa- 
tion. An answer may be that to learn things that do not relate 
to, or are incompatible with, existing beliefs, the learner first 
has to become aware of his or her own perspective. Learning 
may be most effective if the learner is confronted with limi- 
tations in the explanatory power of his or her present concep- 
tions of the world (Anderson, 1977; Piaget, 1954). 
An issue not explicitly dealt with in this article is the extent 
to which group processes may have contributed to learning. 
Webb (1982) and Peterson and Swing (1985) for instance, 
have shown that providing explanations in response to ques- 
tions by peers may be beneficial for both the provider and the 
recipient. This phenomenon may have played a role in the 
present experiments. De Grave et al. (1984) for instance, have 
found small but reliable differences between effects of individ- 
ual and small-group problem analysis on text comprehension; 
these differences favor the latter. Because an information- 
processing, rather than a group-dynamics, perspective was 
adopted in the present experiments, questions regarding the 
influence of contributions of group members on the individ- 
ual's problem representation are left unanswered. 
In conclusion, the data presented suggest that activation of 
prior knowledge through small-group discussion of a problem 
can be a successful instructional strategy for bridging the gap 
between what is already known or can be inferred about a 
subject and new information to be learned. Learners, when 
confronted with a description of natural phenomena, ctively 
construct explanatory models based on the prior knowledge 
they have about these or similar phenomena. The models 
constructed, in turn, facilitate the comprehension of an ex- 
pository text relevant o the problem. These findings are 
explained by the better accessibility and greater cognitive 
coherence provided by the mental models that guide our 
understanding of the world and that ultimately dictate what 
we can learn about that world. 
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Appendix A 
Instruction to Subjects 
Within the context of this experiment, you will be asked, together 
with the other members of your group, to propose an explanation for 
a number of phenomena described in a problem. In order to help you 
understand the nature of the task, we will provide you with an 
example. Read the following description of a problem: 
"It is a hot and humid day. Many ascending dust particles can 
be observed in the air. By the end of the afternoon, dark clouds 
are building up and the weather becomes even more sultry. 
Then, suddenly: Lightning in the far distance, followed by a 
thunderclap. Heavy rain. Explain these phenomena." 
The phenomena, described in this problem, require an expla- 
nation. I f  you think about it for a while, you may come up 
with an explanation like this: 
"It's about a thunderstorm. The lightning you see is the result of 
electric harges of hundred thousands of volts jumping over from 
cloud to cloud or to the earth like 'sparks'. This jumping over is 
accompanied by a sound: the thunderclap. A thunderstorm 
emerges because during warm days, dust charged with static 
electricity ascends into higher strata by means of hot air (hot air 
namely ascends). The dust particles gather in clouds, which by 
that acquire an increasing higher electric harge. If the difference 
in potential between cloud or between clouds and the earth is 
sufficiently large, and the air is sufficiently humid (to facilitate 
conduction), a spark will jump over." 
An explanation like this is, although accurate, somewhat 
superficial. More can be said about the problem, but we will 
not do that here. It is important hat it has become clear 
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which activity will be required from you: You will be pre- 
sented with a problem and your task is to think of  possible 
explanations for the phenomena described in that problem. 
If  you do not immediately know an explanation, for instance, 
because you never have encountered the subject in school, 
you should try to come up with some ideas using common 
sense reasoning. You will see that in many cases you know 
more than you think! 
Appendix B 
Nov ices '  Mode ls  Exp la in ing  the B lood  Cel l ' s  Behav io r  
Swelling 
1. Cell is filled with tiny sponges absorbing the water. 
2. Cell takes in water by unidentified mechanism because wall is 
porous. However, wall contains valves that prevent he water from 
returning. 
3. Red blood cells carry oxygen. Cell withdraws oxygen from 
water and swells. 
4. Cell contains alts dissolved in liquid. Solution exerts pressure 
on wall larger than counterpressure exerted by pure water. 
5. Intake of water triggers unknown chemical reaction in cell. 
Bursting 
6. Blood cells usually take in small amounts of liquids, because 
in the body there are many. In this particular case, there is only one 
cell, who has to take in too much water. 
7. Animate objects only have a limited life-span. 
Shrinking 
8. Water or other liquids are withdrawn from the cell because of 
hygroscopic properties of salt. 
9. Salt water exerts higher pressure on wall than contents of cell. 
10. Salt corrodes wall by affecting wall molecules. Cell begins to 
leak. 
11. Salt diffuses into cell and digests cell from within. 
Swelling and Shrinking in Combination 
12. Cell contains alt which withdraws water from environment 
because of hygroscopic properties. If water in environment contains 
higher concentration however, liquids will be withdrawn from cell. 
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